Professionalism versus amateurism in grass-roots sport: associated funding needs by Cordery, Carolyn J. & Davies, John
 1 
 
 
Professionalism versus amateurism in grass-roots sport:  
associated funding needs 
 
  
 
 
 
Carolyn J Cordery, John Davies 
 
Victoria Business School, Victoria University of Wellington, New Zealand 
 
 
 
Keywords: club sport, rugby union, sustainability of sport, amateur sport finances  
 
 
Acknowledgements  
We are grateful for the support and funding from Sport New Zealand, our Research 
Assistant Andrew Milne and the engagement of the Wellington Rugby Union and its 18 
member clubs in this research. We also acknowledge feedback from participants at the 
Sports Management Association of Australia and New Zealand Conference (Dunedin, 2013), 
seminars at Victoria University of Wellington and Queensland University of Technology, and 
the two anonymous reviewers.  
 
 
 
Corresponding Author:  
Carolyn Cordery, School of Accounting and Commercial Law, Victoria University, Rutherford 
House 23 Lambton Quay, Wellington, Phone: 04 463 5761, Email: 
carolyn.cordery@vuw.ac.nz 
 2 
 
Professionalism versus amateurism in grass-roots sport: associated funding needs 
Abstract 
Considerations of professionalization within sport are typically limited to the 
commercialization processes that generate the funding regimes and impact the expenditure 
patterns of professional sports teams.  By contrast, using historical data, this paper analyses 
how professionalism and the professionalization of elite rugby has impacted the amateur 
game, in general, and challenged the core values of amateurism and the associated funding 
needed for the amateur/grass-roots game, in particular.  It compares funding and 
expenditure patterns in amateur sports clubs for a particular sport – rugby football union, 
aka rugby.  
 This paper utilizes a case study analysis of amateur clubs in the Wellington Rugby 
Football Union, a provincial union of the New Zealand Rugby Union.  It finds that 
professionalism is exhibited in the amateur game both as a top-down phenomenon and a 
bottom-up phenomenon as new actors have entered the institutional field.  The study also 
notes that whilst such changes were gradual, the costs of these changes are now outpacing 
clubs’ ability to fund them. 
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Professionalism versus amateurism in grass-roots sport:  associated funding needs  
Introduction and Background 
The benefits of professional sport are myriad; manifest as better conditioned and prepared 
athletes, with higher skill levels leading to greater spectacles of skill, and highly competitive 
contests attracting large spectator audiences.  The latter often lead to greater commercial 
opportunities, in general, and to enhanced media rights and greater interest in developing 
sponsorship relationships, in particular (see, for example, Pinnuck & Potter, 2006).  Such 
additional focus on generating commercial revenue streams (commercialism) may lead to 
realising those commercial opportunities (commercialization), enabling the funding of 
initiatives associated with professionalization (for example, improved venue and spectator 
facilities, and balanced competitions to boost the spectator experience) that also reflect an 
ethos of professionalism.  As such, commercialization’s revenues not only strengthen a 
belief in notions of commercialism, but also make it possible to pursue a wider range of 
commercial opportunities, and aid the packaging and monetizing of sport experiences to 
bring in these revenues (commercialization), in a virtuous reinforcing cycle.  
 In such environments, spectators/fans also reinforce sport’s embrace of 
commercialism, and drive to commercialization, through purchasing stadium memberships, 
season and match tickets, sport- and team-related merchandise (Andreff & Staudohar, 
2000; Halabi, Frost, & Lightbody, 2012; Owen & Weatherston, 2004; Pinnuck & Potter, 
2006). 
 These funding streams and fan-base not only provide a platform for, and facilitate, the 
professionalization of athlete and performance development systems through improved 
training facilities, medical services, and personal development guidance, but also underpin 
athletes’ commitment to professionalism.  Given this ‘virtuous cycle’, it is unsurprising that 
there is an increasing focus on sustainable commercial revenues, professional teams’ 
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financial viability, and the impact of on-field performance on finances (Andreff, 2007; Halabi 
et al., 2012; O’Brien & Slack, 2003; Owen & Weatherston, 2004; Pinnuck & Potter, 2006). 
 The belief that generating alternative revenue streams from sport-related activities is 
possible and of value (commercialism), complemented by means developed to deliver those 
revenue streams (commercialization), may make it feasible to fund initiatives supporting the 
expression of professionalism.  In illustration, as suggested above, accepting the need to 
boost spectator experience is one manifestation of professionalism; leading to initiatives 
such as improving venue and spectator facilities, and/or engendering balanced competition. 
The success of such initiatives would then likely reinforce, validate and strengthen the ethos 
of professionalism that led to the initiatives’ development.  
 One objective of this research is to explore how professionalism emanating from, or 
associated with, the professionalization of elite rugby, may manifest itself in the amateur 
(grass-roots) game, and how that manifestation may challenge the core amateur values and 
the amateur game’s associated funding needs.  This is important both from a socio-
historical viewpoint (due to the clash of new cultural norms and expectations), and from a 
financial sustainability viewpoint.  The research uses New Zealand rugby and the experience 
of Wellington Rugby Football Union’s clubs in pre- and post-professionalized periods as a 
case study.   
 We utilize an Institutional Theory framework, including the notion of institutional logics 
(DiMaggio & Powell, 1991), to frame the challenging of amateurism by the associated values 
and practices of professionalism and professionalization. A similar theorization has been 
used in sports studies undertaken by O’Brien and Slack (2003, 2004) and Cousens and Slack 
(2005).  To observe the evolution of the organizational field of the amateur game, the 
decision to essentially have professional sportsmen at the elite level is the starting point.  
Historical financial and secondary data on amateur rugby clubs (fundamental to the 
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organisational field) provides a ‘base’, while more recent financial data have been 
complemented by interviews and a focus group showcasing variation in the prevailing 
institutional logics.  For this study, we adopt Thornton & Ocasio’s (1999: 804) description of 
institutional logics as "the socially constructed historical patterns of material practices, 
assumptions, values, beliefs, and rules by which individuals … interpret organizational 
reality, [and] what constitutes appropriate behavior..." 
 Prior studies (O’Brien & Slack, 2003, 2004; Washington & Patterson, 2011) have 
identified tensions between emerging professionalism and erstwhile amateurism within 
elite clubs, for example, with respect to beliefs and values.  Nevertheless, it has been 
generally assumed that despite professionalization in the elite sport’s field (for example, 
affecting practices), the quintessential nature of amateur clubs’ funding needs and 
expenditure has remained unchanged.  Our findings are contrary to views expressed on 
professionalization, professionalism and funding models (for example, Andreff & Staudohar, 
2000; Enjolras, 2002), as we highlight the financial tension that surfaces in amateur clubs 
seeking to embrace and express what they perceive to be professionalism.  Through a multi-
method analysis of the institutional logics operating within the field of amateur rugby, this 
paper shows how, in the nearly twenty years since the decision to ‘professionalize’ elite 
sport, the organizational field of amateur sport clubs has experienced allied changes in 
behaviour and expectations.   
 Changing expectations redolent of professionalism manifest, for example, when clubs 
value and enhance para-medical, physiotherapeutic and medical care; engage in 
sophisticated statistical and match analysis; enhance the preparation and conditioning of 
players; foster the development of coaches and coaching programmes; and develop more 
effective player/talent identification and development systems.  Delivering such 
enhancements through employing professionals such as qualified medical and para-medical 
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staff, physiologists, sport scientists, high performance directors etc. –  establishes new 
career sets as a feature of professionalization with sport.  Meeting these expectations is 
seemingly heedless of consequential effects which may be tangible (such as the clamour of 
associated funding needs) and others less tangible (such as dissonance in the organizational 
field).  
 The focus on rugby, a ‘national sport’ in New Zealand (Davies, Daellenbach, & Ashill, 
2008), may be regarded as a unique case.  Nevertheless, this paper offers insights about the 
witting and unwitting ramifications that may accompany the development of 
professionalism within amateur clubs of any code.  This paper continues by briefly outlining 
notions of professionalization and professionalism, and the institutional theory framework 
used.  The following section describes the casestudy context and the research method. The 
final two sections address results and findings, before a concluding discussion section, and 
pointers to further work. 
Theoretical basis – sport as an organizational field 
Institutional theory provides a framework to understand how the normative structures, 
beliefs, values and ‘rules’ within an organizational field impact behaviour (Davies et al., 
2008; Thornton & Ocasio, 1999).  It has extended beyond merely considering conforming 
behaviour to analysing change (DiMaggio & Powell, 1991; Greenwood & Suddaby, 2006). 
Change is effected within an organizational field, that is, where organizations share 
institutional logics or taken-for-granted rules, identities and social norms (Greenwood & 
Suddaby, 2006; Lynall, Golden, & Hillman, 2011; Scott, 2001).  In these respects, (neo)-
institutional theory may therefore shed light on the emergence of professionalization and 
professionalism, associated values and practices within the domain or greater 
organizational field defined by a rugby football union, and the expression of rugby at 
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different levels within that field: amateur club level, semi-professional provincial level, and 
the elite international and professional level.  
 The rugby ‘field’ includes the formal and informal network ties at these different levels 
(Cousens & Slack, 2005).  Through institutional theory we perceive the dynamic change 
processes, emerging new organizational entities, new linkages between extant 
organizations and new actors and, above all, changes and shifts in the dominant logics 
shaping the relationships or arrangements between the field’s actors (Greenwood, Suddaby, 
& Hinings, 2002). Institutional theory also allows us to analyse ‘jolts’ or disruptions which 
precipitate new logics. Although Greenwood and Suddaby (2006) suggest that exogenous 
jolts are most common, they acknowledge that entrepreneurial peripheral actors may moot 
endogenous disruptions .  Although the central players are embedded within the normative 
processes of the field (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983), entrepreneurial behaviour is likely to 
create dissonance such as a clash between professionalism and amateurism. Greenwood 
and Suddaby (2006) suggest that contestations over the legitimacy of a new logic is 
evidence of its ascendance.  
 Increasingly, sports studies consider change within an organizational field (for example, 
Seippel, 2002; Shilbury & Ferkins, 2011), and also shifts in the dominant institutional logics 
within that field (Cousens & Slack, 2005; Kikulis, 2000; O’Brien & Slack, 2003, 2004).  Such 
institutional logics - how to negotiate and operate within the field – are underpinned by 
schema organizational members establish (Cousens & Slack, 2005; Greenwood et al., 2002).  
Yet, membership-based sports organizations are subject to institutional and environmental 
pressures to change (O’Brien & Slack, 2004).  Accordingly, the emergence of 
professionalization at rugby’s elite level (national or regional) and the surfacing of 
professionalism at club and provincial levels, characterize an organizational field to which 
institutional theory (contributing to an analysis of change) is relevant.   
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 Institutional theory is now well reflected in the sport management literature through, 
for example, studies of Canadian national sports organizations.  Such organizations have 
experienced increasing bureaucracy related to institutional pressure from Sport Canada as 
funders (Slack & Hinings, 1994), and related to the growing professionalism internally arising 
from the emergence of a paid, professional executive funded by Sport Canada (Kikulis, 
2000) – that is, professionalization.  Despite these studies, there have been calls for a multi-
methodological approach to examine the institutional forces within sport (Washington & 
Patterson, 2011).  We argue in this multi-method paper that it is likely that the institutional 
logic reflective of professionalism has begun to impact amateurism in sport, as now 
described.  
 Professionalization and Professionalism – financial and operational perspectives 
In this study, we examine professionalization and professionalism as they arose from the 
decision in 1995 of the International Rugby Board (IRB – now World Rugby) to allow 
payment to players and others associated with the game.  We note the use of the term 
professionalization in the colloquial sense that it applies in sport (but not the professions), 
and as it is commonly, but often inappropriately pitted against amateurism.i  As noted by 
O’Brien and Slack (2003: 418) “amateurism carrie[s] with it much more than a simple 
prohibition on athletes’ financial remuneration” especially because of its connotation with 
the volunteer contributions at club and governance level.  In another sense, amateur values 
and ‘informality’ often means a resistance to over-organization and, elsewhere (as noted by 
Malcolm, Sheard and White, 2000), a concern that players should enjoy the amateur game 
for its own sake, rather than as a showpiece for spectators (as would occur on the 
professionalized stage), or for the extrinsic rewards of payment.  Thus, as 
professionalization is viewed more broadly than payment of players alone, amateurism is 
viewed more broadly than non-payment of players.   
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Professionalization and professionalism are also viewed as extending to various domains 
beyond the playing of the game: management, governance, coaching, player development, 
etc.  For example, Taylor and Garratt (2010) studied professionalism within the domain of 
coaching in the UK, regarding it as reflecting “clearly benchmarked standards, novel forms 
of commercial engagement and ever-present systems of formal accreditation” (Taylor & 
Garratt, 2010: 121).  Some of their interviewees saw payments for coaching 
(professionalization) as an attack on volunteerism and amateur values, which served to 
disrupt clubs’ cultures (and thus institutional logics) (Taylor & Garratt, 2010).  Others have 
found a variety of cultures and values embedded within clubs (O’Brien & Slack, 2003).  
Nevertheless, at grass-roots level, we may expect a dominant logic of amateurism - 
including volunteerism, playing for enjoyment, not for payment etc. – to prevail.  
 In New Zealand rugby, the institutional disruption associated with professionalization 
occurred in concert with the lure of lucrative revenue-generating commercial opportunities 
(commercialism) linked to the elite international inter-provincial rugby competitions.  These 
competitions were conceived by the SANZAR grouping of South Africa, New Zealand and 
Australian Rugby Unions.  In order to secure the tempting media rights payments that were 
on offer (approximately US$800m over a ten year period for the NZRU) by delivering 
attractive competitions and competitive play (the commercialization of sport), institutional 
entrepreneurs recognized that players would need to be ‘professional’.  That is, such 
competitions would require greater demands on player time in terms of travel, and in 
relation to the pursuit of higher levels of fitness, conditioning, and skills.  As such, it was 
considered that rugby players in these new elite international competitions would benefit 
from becoming full-time employees.  Similar expectations could be made of coaches, 
managers, etc.  Acceptance of these higher levels of skill, conditioning, preparation, 
standards and excellence (professionalism), and the ability to secure player time, and 
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dedicate programmes to the pursuit of excellence (professionalization) meant that whilst 
the new dominant logics of professionalization and professionalism may have been 
somewhat in contrast to many clubs’ and players’ experiences and prior amateur statusii, 
they were not at odds with values driving their behaviour.  The following provides some 
rationale for this observation. 
 Professionalism encompasses a “commitment to work to improve one’s capabilities” 
(Hwang & Powell, 2009: 268), combined with an appropriate level of functional capability 
and independent critical thinking in order to improve competitiveness within a field 
(Hussey, Holden, Foley, & Lynch, 2011). More generally, the notion of professionalism 
encompasses “the skill, good judgment, and polite behaviour that is expected from a person 
who is trained to do a job well” (Miriam Webster, 2014).  It is not surprising that Hussey et 
al. (2011), Sundbo et al. (2007), Johnson et al. (2006) and Sheldon (1989), have suggested 
that professionalism can be realized through education and training, and through associated 
socialization processes.iii  Professionalization offers one of these processes.  
 Providing a complementary perspective, Nichols et al. (2005) have offered insights 
about motivations underpinning the emergence of professionalism.  Examining the 
voluntary sport sector in the UK, they commented on the changing field in which private 
sector providers of pay-to-play sport establish themselves in direct competition to 
volunteer- and member-based amateur club sport.  New competitors in that institutional 
field thus provided an external disruption, in effect, pressuring amateur clubs to act with 
professionalism, and correspondingly, to provide ‘professional’ service and delivery (Nichols 
et al., 2005).  O’Brien and Slack (2003) also highlighted the effect of business entrepreneurs 
entering the professional rugby field in the UK. 
 Further, Nichols et al. (2005) referred to other perceived pressures leading to 
expressions of professionalism.  Such pressures reflect societal aversion to different types of 
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risk, including, the risk of sporting injury, and an increasing litigiousness, willingness and 
ability to take legal action against organizations or individuals deemed to be ‘negligent’, 
perhaps in not seeking to improve capabilities (Hwang & Powell, 2009), or in not exercising 
their capability in timely or appropriate manner, or with an appropriate duty of care.  In 
some cases, governments have responded and legislated – with provisions including 
requirements for up-skilling, training and qualification of volunteers (Nichols et al., 2005). 
These actions parallel similar top-down moves towards enhancing the professionalization 
and professionalism of sport-related ‘work’.  It has been stated, elsewhere, that such top 
down initiatives have often led to a bureaucratized sports system (Sherry, Shilbury, & Wood, 
2007).  
 These various institutional logics are depicted in Figure 1.  In brief, Figure 1 captures 
the view that the growing prevalence of commercialism in sport (the lure and rush to 
commandeer commercial revenues) drives commercialization (the packaging of sport as an 
activity that could bring in funds).  As such, the funds received from commercialization 
facilitate professionalization – including the paying of players.  Of course, paying players 
needs commercialization, if clubs and unions are to be financially viable.  In turn, 
professionalization provides opportunity for the expression of professionalism. We regard 
professionalism not only as embodying acceptance of the need for a high level of skill and 
performance, but also the practices and processes – training, conditioning, education - that 
enable a demonstration of skill and play, encourage spectators to value displays of 
professionalism, and thus to seek further professionalization through payment of players 
and associated roles.  Notwithstanding these dominant logics in the elite sport field, the 
argument of Andreff and Staudohar (2000) below, is that professionalization and 
professionalism will not affect the logic of amateurism in the amateur game.  
[INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE] 
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Several studies have explored the impact of professionalism on previously amateur elite 
sports, national sports organizations, and larger amateur sports clubs (Gammelsæter, 2010; 
O’Brien & Slack, 2003, 2004; Seippel, 2002; Shilbury & Ferkins, 2011; Washington & 
Patterson, 2011), yet researchers such as Andreff and Staudohar (2000) have found no 
evidence that the funding models of those that remain as amateur ‘grass-roots’ sports have 
been, or will be, affected by professionalism.  Whilst their findings, and those of Enjolras 
(2002) arise from European studies, they nevertheless provide a comparative base from 
which to consider the funding regimes of amateur (grass-roots) sports clubs, and possible 
links to professional sport.  In examining the financial effects of growing professionalism in 
pre- and post-professionalized periods in a New Zealand setting, we seek to contribute to 
this sparse literature.  
Extant financial/operational models - patterns of revenue in professional and amateur sport 
In terms of financing professionalization in sport, Andreff and Staudohar (2000) describe 
four different models (three professional and one amateur), reflecting revenue patterns and 
the expectations of sporting organizations.  Andreff and Staudohar (2000) describe the 
‘Professional European traditional model’ which, in the absence of sponsorship revenues, 
media rights and commercial rights, focuses on maximising gate receipts and local input – a 
Spectators-Subsidies-Sponsors-Local (SSSL) model.  In this model, as shown in Figure 2, gate 
receipts comprise approximately three quarters (70-85%) of revenues, and government 
subsidies comprise about 15%.  Nevertheless, since the 1980s, a professional ‘Contemporary 
European model’ has emerged where television rights (commercial revenues) have driven a 
Media-Corporations-Merchandizing-Markets (MCMM) model. In the MCMM model, gate 
receipts comprise only 20-40% of revenues, with the balance from merchandizing (around 
20%), sponsors (20-25%) and media (approximately 15%) (Andreff & Staudohar, 2000).  This 
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MCMM model, also shown in Figure 2, reflects a commercialization of sport in order to fund 
the professional teams.iv  
 Figure 2 (extrapolated from Andreff & Staudohar, 2000) shows the changes on 
Manchester United as the funding models evolved from 1970 (SSSL Model) to 1998 (MCMM 
Model).  Andreff and Staudohar (2000) note that, in contrast to French clubs, football clubs 
in the United Kingdom and Italy received lower media revenues, and distinctly different 
proportions of merchandising revenues (between 9.9% and 37.5%).  
[INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE] 
O’Brien and Slack (2004) studied the move towards a MCMM model in elite rugby in 
England, where the emerging dominant logic of professionalism depended on 
commercialism and commercialization: from inter alia, increased sponsorship, marketing of 
merchandise and cash injections from the privatization of clubs.  The professional game not 
only generated benefits for players in terms of salary income, but also in terms of facilitating 
professionalism in administrators and support staff.  Yet, these developments were 
perceived to be in unwelcome contrast to the amateur values and volunteerism that had 
previously underpinned operational norms in English club rugby (O’Brien & Slack, 2004).  
 Unwelcome or not, such developments contributed to a ‘turbulent process’ which 
evidenced a field further characterized by uncertainty of revenues; the financial failure of 
some newly privatized (previously amateur) clubs; and conflict between erstwhile club 
members and the new private sector owners (O’Brien and Slack, 2004).  In some cases, for 
example, in Bedford and London Scottish, fee-paying membership clubs were transferred to 
individual or corporate private owners, while others, in a more ‘democratic’ move, were 
‘sold’ to local members.  Some professional clubs failed when private owners withdrew their 
support and funding (O’Brien & Slack, 2003) as such funding had been necessary to attract 
players, market the club to fans (and potential fans) and maintain operational capacity. 
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 Somewhat distinct from the professional models, Andreff and Staudohar (2000: 274) 
describe an operational and financial model/pattern of European amateur sports, which 
they note “has remained fairly stable over the years and is not expected to change much in 
the future”.  Andreff and Staudohar (2000) reviewed two Swiss clubs which they believed 
were indicative of the amateur model, finding the average member subscriptions comprised 
just over a third (34.45%) of revenue; a quarter (23.25%) of revenue arose from gate 
receipts; one sixth (16%) from commercial activities such as bar receipts; and the remaining 
quarter (26.3%) from grants and other subsidies.  These percentages were similar to 
Enjolras’ (2002) findings relating to Norwegian amateur sports clubs where members 
contribute one third (30%) of revenue; grants comprise almost one tenth (9%), and the 
remainder includes approximately one third (30%) from competitions and sponsorship and 
another third (30%) from fundraising and low level commercial activities.  Echoing Andreff 
and Staudohar’s (2000) view that local sports enthusiasts often have de facto responsibility 
for resourcing and maintaining the viability of grass-roots sport, Enjolras (2002) noted that 
the majority of clubs’ revenues were locally derived, perhaps as a response to ensure 
healthy activity options are made available by local residents for local residents. 
 Moreover, local participation and democracy have long been essential attributes of 
amateur grass-roots sport (Enjolras, 2002) as suggested by the self-organising development 
of unions, associations, federations, confederations and leagues to agree on rules and 
create competitions between members or member clubs.  In their Australian Rules-based 
Carlton Football Club case study, Halabi et al. (2012: 65) described clubs as “allowing 
members to take some exercise and enjoy the company of others” showing similar 
democracy.  We now turn to the context of the New Zealand case study, which is used to 
consider the logics of professionalization, professionalism and amateurism in the 
institutional field of grass-roots rugby in New Zealand. 
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Context of the case research  
New Zealand 1870 – professionalization. A short summary.  
Rugby in New Zealand is, notes Macdonald (1996: 2), a metaphor to “describe the good and 
bad of New Zealand society”.  Following its introduction in 1870 to Nelson, the game quickly 
spread throughout the country, providing a reason to travel in this new nation.  Indeed, 
Macdonald (1996: 4) describes rugby as the “enemy of distance and separation … [which] 
contributed to New Zealand’s sense of national cohesion.”  In their early history of 
Wellington rugby, Swan and Jackson (1952) recount the regular matches between 
Wellington and Nelson. Indications of the spread of rugby can be seen as their records 
recount the ‘first matches’ (and many more) against Wanganui (formed 1872), Auckland 
Provincial (including Metropolitan and Thames in 1873 and Waikato in 1874), games against 
West Coast (North Island) and Otago in 1875, Wairarapa in 1876 and the touring team from 
Great Britain in 1888 (Swan and Jackson, 1952).  While the grass-roots game was fiercely 
amateur from the start, coincident with the timing of the 1905 All Black tour to Great 
Britain, some elite players were compensated for out-of-home expenses when on tour, and 
sometimes for the loss of working time through injury (compensation for ‘broken time’, that 
is loss of working time, had been made in Yorkshire from about 1893) (Macdonald, 1996). 
 The first Wellington rugby club (the Wellington Football Club) was formed in 1871.  
Swan and Jackson (1952) recount the threats from other codes, like ‘Melbourne Rules’ (now 
known as Australian Rules Football), and how such threats were dispelled by the 
opportunities that rugby provided to ‘play away’, and ‘at home’, against neighbouring 
regions.  These opportunities cemented rugby as ‘a game of choice’ in New Zealand.  The 
Wellington Rugby Football Union (WFRU) formed in 1879.  By 1899, the WRFU had 
registered 1119 players in associated clubs, and by 1904, it had registered 17 clubs and 43 
teams (Swan & Jackson, 1952).  From 1906, the game had grown sufficiently to warrant the 
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WRFU appointing a paid secretary to manage rule changes, referee appointments and to 
manage fixtures and amateur competitions (Swan & Jackson, 1952). However, whilst such 
an appointment might be interpreted as an early professionalization of administrative 
services, clubs remained staunchly amateur.  
 As stated earlier, some ninety years later, in 1995, the SANZAR group of national rugby 
unions emerged to develop and manage the sport’s first professional rugby competitions – 
the international, inter-provincial Super Rugby competition, and also the Tri-Nations 
competition between the national representative teams.  The necessary funding arose from 
a multi-country billion dollar contract for television media rights in the three countries.  
Professional rugby, therefore, disrupted the provincial (or state/regional) and national elite 
game.  Initially, a Super 12 (now a Super 15) competition was established with regional 
‘franchises’ fielding professional teams from each of the three countries (Owen & 
Weatherston, 2004).  
 At the outset, the organizational, managerial and financial structures introduced by the 
New Zealand Rugby Union (NZRU) differed from Australia and South Africa.  For example, 
the NZRU created and held ownership of five regional franchise teams representing all 
geographical areas in NZ, but mandated that one host provincial union in each region hold 
and operate the management license for each team.  In addition, all players and coaches 
were centrally contracted to the NZRU, an arrangement which aligned with a modified 
player draft system.  This employment arrangement meant that potentially unhealthy 
competition between franchises for players was minimized, as was the possibility of the 
strong getting stronger at the expense of the weak, or, for example, financially stronger 
regions accumulating the top players.  
 To further address issues of maintaining competitive balance, the NZRU also chose to 
distribute funds to the franchises for player development and marketing (Owen & 
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Weatherston, 2004).  Nevertheless, in a manner dissimilar to the English experience (see 
O’Brien and Slack, 2003), there was a clear distinction between the professional (All Blacks, 
Super 15, and semi-professional ITM Cup teams) and the amateur clubs at the grass-roots 
where payment was not allowed.  
 In New Zealand, as in England, the amateur or grass-roots game continues to be 
considered the life blood or blood bank of the sport, funnelling promising players into the 
professional code and growing a spectator or supporter base for elite competition games.  
Amateur rugby clubs operating at local, provincial and regional levels compete fiercely for 
provincial or regional titles and accolades.  Players may not be paid at local level in the 
amateur game, but Obel (2010) suggests that clubs vie in different ways for gifted players to 
ensure on-field success, which in turn attracts more gifted players and the attention of the 
professional teams’ talent scouts.  In terms of governance, stewardship etc., New Zealand’s 
provincial unions (PUs), as the regional governing bodies, are responsible for the operation 
of these provincial club competitions and ensuring that grass-roots clubs do not pay coaches 
or those involved in other organizational, managerial or administrative roles - that is, clubs 
must depend on volunteers, and continue to be amateur.  
 Notwithstanding such intents, in this paper, we explore the impact of the logics of 
professionalization and professionalism on amateur clubs’ operations or operational 
culture, for example, how clubs’ expenditures reflect support of promising players.  In 
essence, we examine the operations of amateur rugby union clubs from the perspective of 
Andreff and Staudohar’s (2000) revenue model.  In addition, we examine patterns of 
expenditure, taking account of volunteers’ perceptions of how expenditures are 
categorized, legitimized or prioritized.  
Wellington Rugby post-professionalization 
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The PU chosen as the case study union, the WRFU, is typical in many ways of other PUs 
throughout New Zealand that not only support amateur or grass-roots rugby, but also field a 
semi-professional representative provincial team in a national competition (now known as 
the ITM Cup, comprising teams from all 27 provincial unions).  The WRFU also hosts, and 
owns the management license for one of the five teams, the Hurricanes, in the renamed 
Super Rugby competition which also involves five Australian and five South African teams.  
 In a recent review of the PUs, Deloitte (2012) noted that local support, as measured by 
match attendance and gate receipts for these semi-professional teams, had declined by 
more than 50% in the previous five years (from 25% of revenue in 2007 to 13% in 2011).  By 
2011, over two-thirds of PU revenue was derived from business sponsorships, grants from 
gaming machine operators, or from the NZRU’s MCMM revenues (64% of revenue in 2007 
and 70% in 2011).  The PUs’ funding streams are akin to Andreff and Staudohar’s (2000) 
SSSL model.  The PUs gaining the most revenue were those with Super Rugby franchises 
(with the exception of the Otago PU, which ranked 9th out of the 14 leading Premiership and 
Championship PUs) (Deloitte, 2012).  Expenditure patterns amongst the PUs show that 
approximately one half (49%) of expenditure was related to team and game costs; just 
under one third (30%) to growing the game, that is, sport development; and one fifth (21%) 
to administration. 
 Due to declining local support as already mentioned, the PUs cumulatively returned a 
net deficit for each of the three years of the Deloitte (2012) study.  In its analysis, Deloitte 
questioned the on-going viability of the semi-professional and amateur game, or at least the 
PU structures currently operating.  This uncertainty is of concern as, in addition to national 
competitions, these PUs (as the governing body Unions of the amateur clubs) have a 
responsibility for fostering the game’s development by managing the amateur game and 
amateur competitions as well as through promoting rugby as a game of choice.  This paper 
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thus seeks to understand matters of similar concern from the viewpoint of the amateur 
game, as evidenced by examination and analysis of the financial accounts and 
funding/spending patterns of amateur clubs within the WRFU.  
Research Method 
We report on the analysis of patterns or models of sport funding and expenditure amongst 
the grass-roots members of the WRFU, rather than the professional operation.  In order to 
develop data for analysis, audited financial statements were sought for two periods: post-
professionalization and pre-professionalization, as described below.  Subsequently, 
interviews and a focus group with club officials/treasurers were conducted to shed further 
light on the institutional logic and variations between clubs in the post-professionalization 
financial statements.  
 All of the clubs are registered under the Incorporated Societies Act 1908 which requires 
them to file: 
A statement containing the following particulars:  
(a) the income and expenditure of the society during the society’s last financial year: 
(b) the assets and liabilities of the society at the close of the said year: 
(c) all mortgages, charges, and securities of any description affecting any of the 
property of the society at the close of the said year (New Zealand Government, 
1908 s.23(1)).v  
 
The accounts of amateur clubs were sought for a pre-professionalization period.  
Documents held by the Incorporated Societies Registrar were destroyed in a major fire in 
1998, just prior to a planned digitization of records.  Consequently, although two WRFU 
clubs offered archived prior financial statements from the 1980s and 1990s, there was 
insufficient evidence from this source to show pre-professionalization trends across the 
entire WRFU.  A search of the National Archives in Wellington revealed five WRFU member 
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clubs that had been de-registered in the late 1960s and for which financial statements were 
held.vi  These were accessed and analyzed for a fifteen year period from 1950-1965 to 
ascertain a pre-professionalization trend.  A list of these clubs and the reason for their de-
registration is also provided in Table A-1 (in the Appendix).  For the post-professionalization 
period, from 1998-2013, financial statements for each of the 18 member clubs were 
gathered from the Incorporated Societies’vii and Charities Services’viii websites (see Table A-2 
in the Appendix for a club listing).  
 Complementing the financial analysis, interviews with were undertaken with six clubs 
and a focus group was held to which all other clubs were invited.ix  (Responses are identified 
by a coding scheme in the quotes below.)    
   The post-professionalization financial statements were scrutinized to ascertain 
patterns and trends in revenue, expenses, assets and liabilities across the WRFU.  
Expenditure was categorized on a fixed/variable and a discretionary/non-discretionary basis.  
In establishing whether an expense was fixed or variable, club managers and treasurers 
were able to confirm whether an expense would increase with an increase in the number of 
teams.  In distinguishing between a discretionary and non-discretionary expense, 
interviewees were asked whether that expenditure could be justified each year, and 
whether it was essential to the operations of the rugby club.  Ascertaining the extant 
rationale for the treasurers’ categorization of expenditure allowed the researchers to assess 
the extent to which the values of professionalism, and/or of amateur values, were being 
manifest as expenditure norms.  The fixed/variable categorization assisted in ascertaining 
whether size or other factors would affect the proportion of expenditure in different clubs.  
Further, given the limitations of financial statements highlighted by Halabi et al. (2012), 
these interviews were insightful for understanding the financial accounts, enabling a more 
informed analysis of both the pre- and post-professionalization periods.  The interviewees 
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were offered the opportunity to view transcripts and make any changes before the 
interview data was analyzed.  Supplementary to the interviews, as noted, a focus group was 
conducted with a sample of other clubs to provide further verification on the data analyzed.  
 We used the Andreff and Staudohar (2000) framework to categorize the WRFU clubs’ 
revenues as follows: 
 Membership Fees/Total Income: annual subscriptions or levies, casual participation 
fees (where detailed) and non-playing subscriptions; 
 Spectator and Media/Total Income: in the post-professionalization period, funnelled 
through from the WRFU’s and NZRFU’s gate takings and media coverage of 
professional sport;  
 Sponsorship and other External Income/Total Income: donations, sponsorship from 
local businesses and grants from gaming societies and other trusts; 
 Merchandising and Structural Income/Total Income: from running competitions, 
low-level commercialized activities, such as renting out premises, interest, bar 
takings and sale of rugby gear and paraphernalia; and 
 Subsidies and Other/Total Income.x  
It should be noted that amateur clubs in this study are autonomous and therefore may 
generate their revenues and determine their expenditures, and structure their financial 
statements as they wish, without mandate from the WRFU.  In addition to the financial 
analysis of revenues and expenditure of clubs in the post-professionalization era, we also 
examined historical information from secondary sources (including histories of the WRFU 
and of the national game, as referenced).  The findings from these analyses are presented in 
the next section. 
Results and findings 
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Amateur clubs in New Zealand have the status of incorporated societies and are regarded as 
‘non-profit’.  However, clubs should operate for sustainability (Cordery, Sim and Baskerville, 
2013).  Over the fifteen years from 1950-1965, on average, three quarters (77%) of clubs 
made a profit (or surplus) each year while during 1998-2013, this average dropped back to 
fewer than two thirds (63%) (see Table 1).  It is also noted that in the pre-professionalization 
period, clubs consistently spent less than their total income, that is, operated within their 
means.  It may be inferred that clubs were moderately careful with their funds, some 
spending only a third of their revenue in a particular year, as they raised and saved funds, 
for example, to build and furnish a new gymnasium or clubhouse.  Such patterns of surplus 
have not been repeated in the post-professionalization period.  
 [INSERT TABLE 1 HERE] 
In the early years following professionalization in 1995, there were no immediate economic 
cost or benefits for grass-roots clubs in Wellington.  On average, only 2% of the 18 clubs’ 
aggregate revenue in 1998 was sourced from the WRFU (or NZRU).  Yet by 2003, this 
income source averaged one sixth (18%) of clubs’ total revenue.  Commercial benefits 
materialized for the WRFU following the opening of the new Westpac Stadium in 
Wellington’s railway yards in the year 2000.  The stadium enjoyed a honeymoon period as 
‘the place to be and to be seen’, dramatically increasing guaranteed revenue streams for 
the WRFU through Stadium Membership and Season Ticket sales. This period was combined 
with relative success on the playing field for the professional Hurricanes team (in the 
international Super 15) and the semi-professional Wellington Lions (in the national 
provincial championship: at the time, the Air New Zealand National Provincial Championship 
(NPC), now the ITM cup).  The resulting healthy profits from the WRFU’s management of 
Hurricanes’ and Lions’ operations (similar to the findings in Pinnuck and Potter, 2006), were 
not only fed back into the professional game, but also invested by the WRFU in the amateur 
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game.  Amateur clubs received substantial ‘trickle down’ income, sharing the benefits of 
such commercialization for the best part of a decade, with more than one club agreeing 
with the interviewee who stated that the ‘Westpac Stadium turned the rugby club’s finances 
around’ (AM513).  When the local professional franchise (the Hurricanes) enjoyed strong 
commercial revenue and generated surplus, clubs received shares of owner-dividends or 
funds that were proportionate to their registered player base.  However, as attendances 
and season ticket sales subsequently dwindled, by 2009, these trickle down benefits ceased, 
with the proportion of clubs’ total revenue sourced from the WRFU (and NZRU) , dropping 
from 18% in 2003, to 12% in 2008 and 6% in 2013 (see Table A-3 in the Appendix).  
Results and findings: revenue matters 
The findings from the analysis of the pre-professionalization period do not mirror the 
amateur sports model of Andreff and Saudohar (2000), nor of Enjolras (2002), as can be 
seen in Figure 3 (and Table A-3 in the Appendix).  In these historical financial statements, 
the income from member subscriptions did not reach the one-third level (30-35%) asserted 
as typical by these researchers.  A majority of funds were raised through physical and socio-
structural-related activities (for example, from the hiring-out of their (physical) premises or 
facilities, and as bar trading from their social club operations), from external sources.  For 
clubs in the pre-professionalization period, external funding was derived from fundraising 
activities and donations, rather than the sponsorship and gaming funds which predominate 
in the post-professionalization period.  Whilst the level of external funding averaged 21% of 
all income in the pre-professionalization period, it rose to just over half (52%) of clubs’ total 
income in the post-professionalization period (see Figure 3).   
 [INSERT FIGURE 3 HERE] 
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Despite the temporal proximity of the post-professionalization period of rugby to the era of 
amateur sports studied by Andreff and Saudohar (2000) and Enjolras (2002) in Europe, their 
funding patterns/models are largely different from revenue patterns for Wellington rugby 
(as a New Zealand case).  By 2014, the relative contribution of membership fees as income 
for the amateur rugby clubs had dropped even lower than the pre-professionalization 
period.  As implied above, clubs were receiving a greater proportion of revenues from 
external sources (sponsorship and grants) (52%), in contrast to the European studies where 
such contributions had been no more than one-third (30%) of revenues (including 
government subsidies).  By contrast, income from socio-structural sources (including 
merchandising) and spectator support (in this case, gate revenues for the elite Hurricanes’ 
and Lions’ teams) are similar to the Andreff and Staudohar (2000) amateur model (as can be 
seen in Figure 3 and Table A-3).  However, it is notable that spectators as a source of gate 
revenues have declined since the heyday of the Westpac stadium spectator boom.  Whilst 
Enjolras (2002) asserted that grass-roots clubs are places for locals to participate, and to 
contribute to the funding of clubs via spectator/gate revenues, in this study, the vast 
majority of spectator funds are paid to, and relate to the elite team games, rather than club 
games.   
 Overall, the data for this study contrasts to Andreff and Saudohar’s (2000) assertion 
that the revenue pattern/model for amateur sport is stable.  Moreover, it shows 
professionalization has had a pervasive impact on amateur clubs’ funding.  For instance, 
external income (from sponsorship and gaming funding) has escalated from an average of 
21% in the pre-professionalization period to an average of 52% in the post-
professionalization period.  Indeed, the ready availability of gambling related/gaming trust 
funds for rugby during this period, has led the NZRU to state that any changes to such 
availability through the re-allocation of funds to other sports or worthy causes, would do 
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“lasting and widespread harm” to the game. xi   Reflecting a club perspective, one 
interviewee noted how revenues from gaming trusts have a direct impact on membership 
fees: 
Yes, because it is so easy to get grants, it is political suicide to raise subscriptions. If 
you as a Chair of a rugby club say, “we are going to increase the subscriptions … 
[you’re] not going to be the Chairman for very long, because the club delegates will 
tell him, “Bugger off”, and the club players will be even more forthright. So we have 
an age where players expect [benefits] rather than paying to play. (CC309) 
 
At the club level, external funding has allowed membership fees or subscriptions to reduce 
steadily as a percentage of total revenue.  While, in the pre-professionalization period, 
membership fees averaged almost 20% of clubs’ total income, following professionalization 
(except for the 1998 year), membership fees totalled less than 10% of clubs’ total income.  
This situation is unique to rugby with its elite professionalized game, as implied by another 
interviewee who noted the disparity between rugby membership fees and those of other 
sports: 
Well a lot of it’s historic. I joined the club thirty one years ago and I paid an honorary 
subscription and thirty one years later it’s still exactly the same amount. But … I’ve 
got friends who play hockey … [and] soccer … but the thing is it’s [expensive]… We 
charge our teams, it depends what team… we charge less because they’ve actually 
gone out and got their own sponsors for gear. (CC109) 
 
While this comment implied that the potential for amateur rugby clubs to choose to 
maintain relatively low membership fees is related to a club’s ability to access sponsorship 
funds, another interviewee suggested that some rugby clubs perceive a need to keep 
membership fees low because of the socio-economic composition of their players: 
But the problem you’ve got in setting subs for rugby clubs is the ability of the 
people to pay… Well we actually put it up by just a little bit this year …by twenty 
dollars… We compare to other clubs, we know what other clubs are charging and 
there’s probably a reluctance in all the clubs to put it up because they’ve got so 
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many Samoans and that who are really gonna struggle if you start whacking it up. 
(CC209) 
The WRFU, as the PU governing body, is also instrumental in these matters as the nature of 
its relationship with member clubs differs from other team sports whose membership fees 
are $250-$450 per season (compared to an average of $120 across the WRFU in 2013).  For 
instance, a large proportion of the membership fees paid by soccer, hockey and netball 
players to their clubs is sequestered by their provincial and national bodies to fund activities 
at provincial and national level (Cordery & Baskerville, 2009).  By contrast, the operations of 
the NZRU and the WRFU generate commercial and other revenues which are sufficient to 
obviate the need to draw on the grass-roots to fund either the elite game or provincial or 
national operations.  Such a funding regime appears long standing, for where fees were paid 
to the WRFU by the clubs in the pre-professionalization period (although not evident in all 
years), it was typically one guinea per club (£1.1.0 or 21 shillings in pre-decimal currency, 
and the equivalent of $2.20 at decimalization in 1967).  This small amount was obviously a 
token ‘club fee’ rather than a fee charged per player or per team as most other sports 
charge their amateur players today.   
 In summary, the findings on amateur clubs’ revenues, and how such revenues may be 
sourced, differ markedly from those of Andreff and Saudohar (2000), and Enjolras (2002), 
particularly in terms of clubs’ perceptions of relevant facts for setting and charging 
membership fees, including the perceived need for, and/or consequences of generating 
revenue input from ‘local enthusiasts’.  Therefore, we also sought to determine how the 
expenditure patterns of amateur clubs might reflect the growing professionalism of the 
sport.  
 
Results and findings: expenditure matters 
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We could find no study which has examined the broader finances of ‘typical’ amateur sports 
clubs.  Nonetheless, the pre- and post-professionalization period data for the WRFU rugby 
clubs facilitates such analysis and comparison between the periods (see Figure 4 and Table 
A-4 in the Appendix).  Whilst expenditure on property (about one third, 32-36%) and 
administration (about one sixth, 16-17%) are broadly similar in the pre- and post- eras, we 
note, in particular, that the average proportion of total income spent on playing 
expenditure rose from one fifth (20%) in the pre-professionalization period to well over one 
third (42%) in the post-professionalization period.  
[INSERT FIGURE 4 about HERE] 
Categorization of post-professionalization expenditure data showed that more than three 
quarters (75.5%) of total expenditure was deemed by clubs to be non-discretionary.  It was 
also noted that the expenditure most likely to be deemed non-discretionary was the playing 
(match-related)xii expenditure (27.5%) and playing (development)xiii expenditure (18.5%).  Of 
this, almost two thirds (60%) of the playing expenditure related to match-related activities, 
and the remainder to game development.  This pattern of expenditure emphasis suggests 
attempts to replicate the professionalism associated with elite sport and elite athletes, and 
also acceptance of a need to better prepare/train amateur athletes to participate at the 
elite level. 
 Within the playing expenditure category, the majority of match-related expenditures 
were considered by respondents to be vital, that is, non-discretionary.  This included the 
provision of players’ uniforms and, for example, laundering them each week; and then for 
Premier teams, para-medical and other related expenses.  In particular, in the post-
professionalization period, clubs have instigated a range of responses to player welfare and 
player injury matters: with many clubs choosing to require a qualified physiotherapist who 
receives part-payment for some services, and who provides other pro-bono services to 
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support teams. Some clubs maintain a special fund to help players to gain access to 
treatment, and one club has insured their premier players for player income replacement 
relating to sickness or injury not covered by New Zealand’s Accident Compensation 
scheme.xiv  These services are additional to the many hundreds of metres of medical or 
strapping tape provided for practice and game-day to provide protection and support to 
players who perceive some form of muscular or soft tissue injury.  While strapping is useful 
to reduce injury, one interviewee suggested that much of the strapping is for show to mirror 
professional teams:  
... some of them really don’t need to be strapped to the extent they want to, you 
know, it looks good on the telly. (AM213, int 1) 
 
By contrast, discretionary playing (match-related) expenditure tended to include after-
match catering and hospitality for players and officials, and mid-week post-training meals 
also catering for players.  This catering was fairly typical for the Premier grade club teams; 
however, the similar provision of subsidized catering for visiting teams and players has often 
been related to socio-cultural factors and expectations within clubs.  In some cases, 
transport to ‘away’ games was offered, often at a subsidized rate, but many noted the need 
for the player ‘to contribute something’.  
 Major decisions relating to the playing (development) expenditure can be linked the 
WRFU’s decision to co-fund the employment of Rugby Development Officers (RDOs - aka 
Club Coaching Organisers - CCOs).  The WRFU’s commitment to make co-funding available, 
in effect, to endorse the employment of coach-qualified RDOs, had resulted in many clubs 
also choosing to endorse such employment, and deeming it to be an essential part of their 
development programmes and survival.  Interviewees also expected that such expenditures 
would be partly met by grants from gaming trusts funded by their gaming machine 
operations. 
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 It was estimated that in 2013, playing (match-related) expenditure averaged $283 per 
player, and that player subscriptions or membership fees contributed, on average, only 40% 
($120) of that expenditure. Furthermore, when clubs’ total expenditure was averaged 
across all registered senior or adult players, it was found that the subsidy or shortfall per 
player-contribution to total expenditure averaged $862.  As noted above, the shortfall in 
covering these costs is borne and made affordable by gaming trust/gaming machine 
revenues, sponsorships and other miscellaneous fundraising, as well as trickle down 
revenues from the WRFU and NZRU.  Nevertheless, and despite such revenues, the post-
professionalization period has seen an increase in the number of clubs making losses (see 
Table 1).  
Results and findings: professionalization and professionalism 
These findings suggest that the professionalization of elite rugby has impacted financial and 
cultural aspects of amateur club rugby.  For example, there has been a dual financial impact, 
firstly on revenue (with the WRFU trickle down of spectator and media income, and a 
reluctance to increase membership fees), and secondly, on expenditure (with players 
demanding professionalism – or ‘professional’ services – from clubs).  As indicated above, in 
some cases, cultural effects were observed.  For example, regardless of any perceived move 
to professionalism, some clubs strengthened their resolve to retain the amateur values or 
code.  Yet others believed that certain allowances, for example, for travel expenses, and 
departures to the amateur code could be accepted.  
 In respect of player payment, one interviewee implied disapproval, for example, that 
such ‘allowances’ would be paid by the club to retain quality players, but inferred that 
supporters may assist the club to retain its amateur status by making such payments: 
We know that there was a player last year who was being paid two hundred dollars 
a week travel money to come [to play], but that was actually picked up by a 
benevolent club member. He heard he was going to go to another club and said, 
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“Look if I pay you your petrol money to (come), will you?” (Researcher: “and it was 
nothing to do with you?”) No. (AM113) 
Another club official justified such payments as:  
‘We’re permitted to pay them petrol money’. (AM613) 
In illustration of the diverse views that exist, such requests for monetary sweeteners would 
be met, at yet other clubs, with ‘a sharp boot up the bum’ (AM413), and a strong line taken 
to maintaining the amateur ethos, as an interviewee noted: 
We’re really entrenched in our traditions; I mean we’re purely an amateur club. 
There are clubs around now who are not amateur, they say they are, but we know 
they’re not, we know those coaches are being paid, we know there’s players are 
being given incentives, where we have a zero [tolerance] on that. We don’t tolerate 
that and if anyone comes to us, a top coach and he wants some allowance, we just 
can’t do it, and we don’t do it, we don’t want to do it … You can’t buy 
championships. (AM213, int 1) 
... and further disapproval of payment is evident in the comment; 
 That’s (... money ...) what’s killing rugby. (AM213, int 2) 
 
This last statement was echoed by other clubs taking similar stances:  
And any quality player that’s out there gets shoulder tapped for another union 
because of the money.  So money has not helped rugby at all, I think it’s been 
detrimental to club rugby. (AM613) 
… I think the professional game certainly hasn’t done club rugby any favours in that 
respect. (AM313) 
 
Nevertheless, it was evident that some clubs used means other than money to encourage 
performance.  For example, at one club where the teams’ fortunes had been poor in the 
previous season, the club Manager noted: 
We’ve done a lot of soul searching… and we put in place a strategic plan to address 
some of the shortcomings that we identified …  And we’re now sending players 
overseas for three or four weeks at a time, on scholarships through our contacts with 
overseas clubs and overseas people.  And so I don’t think there’s any other club in 
Wellington that’s doing that … And that’s effectively our strategic plan, we don’t 
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want to turn everybody into professional rugby players but we will provide excellent 
coaching, excellent mentoring, excellent programmes for personal and player 
development. (AM313) 
 
It may be inferred that, whilst such a ‘strategic plan’ essentially endorses and embraces a 
move to professionalism (in terms of striving for excellence, duty of care etc.), this 
interviewee (AM313) recognises that other clubs may not perceive or embrace 
professionalism in the same way.  Indeed, the interviewee presumed that their club was 
different from others in sending players away.  
 However, a number of other clubs have utilized the International Rugby Academy of 
New Zealand (IRANZ) residential coaching courses to reward, motivate and up-skill players 
and coaches, depending on the receipt of grants to fund participation.  Participation in the 
coaching programme allows talented players ‘to get noticed’, but it is also a response to the 
professionalized attitudes, that is, professionalism, brought back to the club by their players 
who have become professionals.  For example, club players who have graduated to the 
professional ranks often return to their club to socialise, train and practice; and clubs 
accommodate professional players who need to gain more playing time, or are returning 
from injury.  In the latter situations, clubs have accepted that such accommodation is itself a 
scenario where the needs of the professional game and professionalism pose challenges for 
amateurism.  One interviewee noted, for example, that: 
It’s difficult because it’s grass-roots rugby, but we’re mixed with professionals. 
Sometimes we have the professionals here playing with the guys and so it’s a really 
fine line.  You try and keep it as grass-roots as possible but it’s … actually being more 
professional because we’re trying to develop professionals … For the most part it’s 
about community sport and community involvement.  But we have a group of people 
who want to be professionals and so we need to be able to provide that.  And so that 
expectation has changed a heck of a lot. But we’ve had a few [times we’ve had to 
say] “Well you can have this but you can’t have that.”  Teams used to be fed after 
every game; well [we’ve said] ‘actually bring yourself something to eat.  When 
you’re in the All Blacks you can have a feed after the game’.  So, just little things like 
that. (AM413) 
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The desire for professionalism also surfaces when amateur players require, for example, 
feedback from the WRFU or IRANZ-qualified coach, who is not only expected to watch a 
match, but also to review and analyse the match video, just as would a professional coach.  
In some clubs, it has also become an expectation that away-games are uploaded to websites 
for fans who have been unable to attend.  
 Besides funding participation in developmental programmes, and feeding expectations 
of directed personalized advice from coaching personnel, other measures that are perceived 
as required to develop and prepare players to play at a higher level require a range of 
dedicated staff and/or volunteers. As a response to such pressures on volunteer time, and 
despite the amateur code, one club decided that some reward/recognition in the form of an 
honorarium was appropriate: 
… about six or seven years ago I suppose, the chairman at the time decided that a lot 
of people were doing a lot of work and a lot of good things and we want to keep 
them on board and we thought, well how do we keep these people involved?  So he 
decided that what we would do we’d pay honorarium … certainly not commensurate 
in any way shape or form with the hours or all the, in terms of a rate of pay …  
Because you just can’t repay, you just can’t pay that type of money … It’s up to the 
discretion of the treasurer of the time.  There was a rule of thumb that 10% of your 
total revenue would be available for distribution as honoraria …  Nobody has a right 
to expect any honoraria, so at the end of the year it’s up to the treasurer to make 
the call. (AM313) 
 
Whilst such provision of honoraria, in these circumstances, has been a new phenomenon, 
some of the pre-professionalization financial statements provide evidence of small amounts 
of honoraria having being paid for ‘secretarial services’, but far less than 10% of revenue.  
Regardless of the amount paid as honoraria, it can be expected that increasing demands on 
amateur volunteers to be professional in their delivery of services can impact the bottom 
line.  
Discussion and Conclusions  
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The research outlined in this paper examines how professionalism emanating from the 
professionalization of elite rugby, manifests itself in the amateur (grass roots) game, and 
how that manifestation may challenge the core amateur values, on the one hand, and the 
amateur game’s associated funding needs, on the other hand.  The research shows the 
impact of an entrepreneurial jolt from the elite sport on amateur finances.  This study has 
built on, and extended, prior European work to the specific domain of an amateur rugby 
union in New Zealand.  Differently from prior work, it suggests an implicit move within the 
amateur code towards the SLSS and MCMM model (Andreff and Staudohar, 2000) that 
funds the professional game at regional and national levels.  In particular, revenue from 
membership fees (and funds distributed by the WRFU) has increasingly diminished as a 
percentage of total club revenues.  The major revenue stream continues to be externally 
derived sponsorship and grants from gaming trusts funded through their gaming machine 
operations, although this stream of funding is subject to political uncertainty and socio-
economic pressures that limit discretionary disposable income.  The reduction of financial 
dependence on physical and socio-structural sources suggests that professionalization has 
replaced these clubs’ funding from community/internal (and what were previously accepted 
as ‘traditional’) social activities, with external commercial sponsorship, with trickle-down 
funding from the professional game.  
 Amateur rugby clubs in this study showed signs of financial vulnerability as has been 
found in prior studies (for example, Andreff, 2007; Cordery et al., 2013; Pinnuck & Potter, 
2006; Wicker & Breuer, 2011).  In addition, they bear the burden or drain of reduced profits 
from the professional arm of the sport (via the WRFU).  Any move towards an MCMM 
model at club level to address financial woes, is limited by finite revenues available to sport.  
Not only are commercialization efforts constrained, but also clubs’ de facto coupling in the 
network (of Unions) restricts their options for competitive commercialism (Greenwood & 
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Suddaby, 2006).  Nevertheless, the resources promised to, or anticipated by, the amateur 
game as a result of an entrepreneurial jolt in the professional game, are much greater than 
those resources able to be garnered by amateur clubs alone.  Whether the tensions or 
constraints can be accommodated is questionable, as professionalism is resource-intensive 
and demands more from amateur participants than they currently are able or prepared to 
give. 
 Nevertheless, as Greenwood and Suddaby (2006) note in their analysis of accounting 
entrepreneurs, to focus only on revenues offers an incomplete story. They observed, for 
example, the phenomenon of accounting consultancies responding to clients’ needs using 
skills developed through the educational requirements and programs of the professional 
body - professionalization. Similarly, we observe the professionalization of elite rugby, and 
professionalism within elite rugby, have also been a response to the needs of many 
stakeholders within the institutional field of sport – spectators, players, administrators and 
media. In addition, the new institutional logics of professionalization and professionalism 
impact on the stakeholders of amateur clubs, and also attracts new supporters and talented 
players to feed the game.  This happens in a manner suggested by Zajac and Westphal 
(2004) that is dependent not only on the new prevailing logic(s) but also the degree of 
institutionalization within the wider environment, and the legitimacy acquired by the 
prevalence of professional practices amongst other clubs. In particular, as the practices 
associated with professionalization and professionalism become institutionalized, “building 
symbolic value as normatively appropriate elements” of professionalization and 
professionalism, amateur clubs would be more likely to adopt professionalism, whilst still 
attempting a ”decoupling” of certain behaviours “to preserve informal routines ... and 
(amateur) interests” (Zajac & Westphal, 2004: 434).  So, the values associated with the 
newly acquired institutional logics of professionalization and professionalism are perceived 
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as positive for the game as a whole, despite the ready response to new opportunities 
eschewing the prior dominant amateur norms.  
 In this study, we have combined qualitative interview data with historical quantitative 
analysis to identify changes to prevailing logics within the organizational field of rugby 
union, and how the institutional logics of professionalization and professionalism have 
impacted amateurism and the amateur game (Thornton & Ocasio, 1999).  Expenditure 
patterns have identified, for example, significant perceptions and expectations within clubs 
relating to the support for, and development of promising players to feed into the 
professional game.  The former include, for example, the funding of match-related 
expenses: uniforms, playing equipment, medical and physiotherapeutic expenses, and 
laundry (and sometimes meals).  The latter include, for example, player development 
academies, and residential coaching programmes.  These findings mirror those of Nichols et 
al. (2005), in as much as they also capture amateur rugby clubs’ attempts to provide and 
match many of the player-related support services that have become standard within elite 
professional clubs.  In addition, many amateur clubs have striven to replace uncertified 
coaches, trainers, strappers and rubbers with qualified coaches, fitness conditioners, 
doctors, physiotherapists and masseurs – and in their attempts to act with professionalism, 
they mirror the practices and de facto controls of professional bodies on those seeking entry 
of ‘workers’ to the field.  These new ‘support’ actors have entered the organizational field 
(as suggested by Cousens and Slack, 2005; Kikulis, 2000; Seippel, 2002; Shilbury and Ferkins, 
2011) concurrent with professionalism gaining dominance as a prevailing institutional logic.  
 Additionally, the WRFU and the NZRU have facilitated professionalization and 
professionalism by also imposing specific conditions on who may be appointed to many of 
these support roles – a top-down phenomenon.  PUs (like the WRFU), require all coaches 
appointed to representative teams to meet appropriate education, training and 
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qualification requirements.  Further, significant sums have been spent by the WRFU and its 
constituent clubs on game-development by the employment of professional RDOs who 
contribute to the sustenance and sustainability of rugby in their localities, and also to the 
national game.  Yet, their employment reflects the clubs’ acceptance of, participation in, 
and contribution to a growing professionalization and professionalism within the sport.  
Such values and perceptions are, of course, redolent of the institutional norms present 
within the wider organizational field that are experienced at the amateur club level, and 
which are strengthened by interaction at the union level, and between actors within clubs 
and others at the professional level. 
As the dominant logic changes from amateurism to professionalization and professionalism, 
the organizational field expands to include these new ‘professional’ actors, as Greenwood et 
al. (2002) suggest.  Such professionalism is anticipated to reduce the use of volunteers, 
potentially side-lining the ‘local enthusiast’ (Hwang & Powell, 2009; Taylor & Garratt, 2010).  
This leads to questions for further research about how amateur sport will reconstitute and 
finance itself if volunteers, perceiving their efforts to be less valued, withdraw their freely 
donated contributions of skills, time and effort, thus leading to a consequential greater 
dependence on the services of paid contributors, administrators and professionals.  The 
counter-factual alternative question is whether amateur clubs will choose to ‘take back’ 
their core values, as suggested by O’Brien and Slack (2003)? 
 In considering the direction of future research, this study, in exploring 
professionalization, professionalism and amateurism in sport, is subject to limitations, as it 
focuses on only one region in New Zealand and one sport, rugby.  It also draws on financial 
statements which, as noted by Halabi et al. (2012), may not be appropriately transparent.  
The interviews and focus group undertaken with administrators within the amateur game 
(many of whom have three to four decades’ experience) partly mitigated this shortcoming.  
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 Nevertheless, the paper contributes to the development of an amended amateur 
‘model’ of funding and expenditure, building on Andreff and Staudohar’s (2000), and 
Enjolras’ (2002) conceptualizations of the operational and financial patterns/models of 
European amateur sports with a Southern Hemisphere example.  It recognises, for example, 
a feature perhaps unique to a sport which has professionalized, but not privatized – the 
phenomenon of reduced playing membership fees for amateur rugby players and clubs, a 
phenomenon in rugby that has occurred in tandem with increasing support from national 
and provincial parent bodies (also not visualized by Andreff and Staudohar, 2000) and from 
sponsorship opportunities.   
 This paper has drawn on multiple strands of prior research (including studies informed 
by institutional theory, such as Cousens & Slack, 2005; Kikulis, 2000; O’Brien & Slack, 2003, 
2004; Seippel, 2002; Shilbury & Ferkins, 2011).  However, it differs in that it uses historical 
accounting data to shed light on an important contemporary phenomenon in a novel 
context, the context of sport.  The challenge remains of demonstrating the value of an 
accounting perspective in other contexts where payments to elite performers impact 
amateur associations, that is, where professionalization and professionalism affect 
amateurism.  Washington and Patterson (2011: 10) state that “one major contribution that 
institutional theory can make to the sport literature is theorizing the emergence, stability, or 
decline of sport related institutions” – we do this by providing a multi-level 
conceptualization of how commercialism and commercialization of elite sport impacts 
professionalization; how professionalization impacts professionalism at the elite level; and 
then how funding and financial structures combine with the emergence of a growing 
professionalism at the grass-roots level, to impact the nature and viability of grass-roots 
(amateur) sport (See Figure 1).  In doing so, we extend Thornton and Ocasio’s (1999: 802) 
long standing assertion that “institutional logics define the rules of the game” – to a 
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sporting field.  In particular, we have shown that prevailing logics not only shape behaviour 
in organizations and organizational fields, but that they change over time, shaped by other 
social, cultural, economic and environmental influences, and other higher-order 
institutional logics.    
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Archival Data 
Archives New Zealand, Wellington Office, R1915450, The Rongotai College Old Boys Rugby 
Football Club Incorporated, 1950-1970 Record no 766. 
Archives New Zealand, Wellington Office, R1915486, Eastbourne Rugby Football Club 
Incorporated, 1924-1970 Record no 802. 
Archives New Zealand, Wellington Office, R1916005, Berhampore Rugby Football Club 
Incorporated, 1929-1978 Record no 1379. 
Archives New Zealand, Wellington Office, R3123096, Hutt Rugby-Football Club 
Incorporated, 1919?-no date Record no 721. 
Archives New Zealand, Wellington Office, R3123100, High School Old Boys Rugby Football 
Club Incorporated, 1945?-no date Record no 725. 
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Table A-1: Clubs with financial statements used for Pre-Professionalization Period 1950-1965 
Club Berhampore Rugby 
Football Club 
Incorporated 
Affiliated 1913 
(recessed 1916/18). 
Was registered as 
Pirates Football Club 
from 1936 and 
changed name for 
Union to Berhampore 
1946, but registered 
name change only in 
1955 
Eastbourne Rugby Football 
Club Incorporated 
Joined Union 1921 
Hutt Rugby-Football 
Club Incorporated  
High School Old Boys 
Rugby Football Club 
Incorporated 
Was registered as 
Woburn Rugby 
Football Club (Inc.). 
(Joined Union 1945). 
Name change 
registered in 1955.  
The Rongotai College 
Old Boys Rugby 
Football Club 
Incorporated 
Miramar Districts 
joined Union 1920, 
Seatoun (1929) and 
Rongotai College Old 
Boys. Formed 
Eastern Suburbs 
Rugby Football Club 
Incorporated 1950. 
Name change 
registered in 1975 
Reason for de-
registration 
Closed down Struck Off due to non-filing 
of financial accounts (re-
registered at least from 
1997, but perhaps earlier) 
 
Merged to become Hutt Old Boys (and 
eventually Hutt Old Boys Marist) Rugby Football 
Club Incorporated in 1967 
Amalgamated into 
Oriental Rongotai 
Football Club (Inc) 
Accounts for: 1929-1969 1924-1966 1923-1969 1946-1969 1954-1968 
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APPENDIX Table A-2: Clubs in the Wellington Rugby Union (Post-Professionalization financial statements accessed)*  
Avalon Rugby Football 
Club Incorporated 
Formed 1979 (includes 
Naenae - joined Union - 
1951 and Taita - joined 
Union in 1951) 
Eastbourne Rugby 
Football Club 
Incorporated 
Joined Union 1921 
Hutt Old Boys Marist 
Rugby Football Club 
Incorporated 
Formed 1993 [includes 
Hutt Club formed – 
1910 (comprising (new) 
Epuni - joined Union 
1892 and Kia Ora Club - 
joined Union 1898) and 
Marist Brothers Old 
Boys - joined Union 
1952 
Johnsonville Rugby 
Football Club Inc. 
Joined Union 1904 
Marist St Pats Rugby 
Football Club 
Incorporated 
Formed 1971 (includes 
St Pat’s College Old 
Boys - joined Union 
1909 and Marist Old 
Boys - joined Union 
1908) 
Northern United 
Rugby Football Club 
Inc. 
Formed 1989 (includes 
Porirua - joined Union 
1910 and Titahi Bay 
Rugby Football Club - 
joined Union 1955) 
College Old Boys – 
Victoria University 
Rugby Club Inc 
Victoria University 
College - joined Union 
1903 
 
Oriental Rongotai 
Football Club (Inc) 
Oriental joined Union 
1887 (recessed 
1892/3) 
Paremata Plimmerton 
Rugby Football Club 
Incorporated 
Includes Plimmerton - 
joined Union 1931 and 
Paremata - joined 
Union 1945 
Petone Rugby Club 
(Incorporated)  
Joined Union 1885.  
Amalgamated 1891 
with Epuni -joined 
Union 1886 and Petone 
Albion - joined Union 
1886.  
Poneke Football Club 
Inc 
Formed 1882 “Our 
Boys’ Club”. Renamed 
1885 
Rimutaka Rugby 
Football Club 
Incorporated 
Joined Union 1982. In 
2014 (after research 
period) joined with 
Upper Hutt to form 
Upper Hutt Rams 
Rugby Football Club. 
Stokes Valley Rugby 
Football Club 
Tawa Rugby Football 
Club (Inc.) 
Upper Hutt Rugby 
Football Club Inc 
Wainuiomata Rugby 
Club (Inc) 
Wellington Football 
Club Incorporated 
Western Suburbs 
Rugby Football Club 
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Incorporated 
Joined Union 1949 
Joined Union 1947 Joined Union 1909 Joined Union 1946 Formed 1871 Incorporated 
Formed 1983 [includes 
Athletic Club formed 
1877, Karori formed 
1876 (and after recess 
joined Union 1884) 
and Onslow- joined 
Union 1922) 
 
* Historical data from Swan and Jackson (1952), respective clubs’ websites and “Wellington Club Rugby”. 
(www.clubrugby.co.nz/wellington/story.php?id=790) 
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Table A-3 Breakdown of Income type as a percentage of total income for each five year period 
Year Membership Income/ 
Total Income 
Structural & Merchandizing 
Income/ Total Income 
Sponsorship and other 
External Income/ Total Income 
Spectator and Media Income 
(WRFU/NZRU) /Total Income 
Other inc/ Total Income 
(Includes govt subsidies) 
1950 21% 70% 9% 0% 0% 
1955 15% 65% 20% 0% 0% 
1960 14% 57% 29% 0% 0% 
1965 27% 48% 25% 0% 0% 
1998 16% 25% 54% 2% 2% 
2003 10% 18% 51% 18% 3% 
2008 9% 21% 45% 12% 12% 
2013 10% 24% 55% 6% 5% 
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Table A-4 Breakdown of Expenditure type as a percentage of total income for each five year period 
 Property Expend./Total Inc Administration Expenditure /Total Inc Playing Expenditure /Total Inc Interest & other Expenditure /Total Inc 
1965 34% 22% 31% 1% 
1960 43% 14% 22% 3% 
1955 23% 12% 9% 1% 
1950 47% 17% 20% 1% 
1998 36% 17% 43% 4% 
2003 33% 16% 41% 4% 
2008 25% 19% 43% 12% 
2013 35% 18% 42% 6% 
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No effect?
 
 
Figure 1. Professionalization and Related Concepts. 
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Figure 2. Comparison of Financing from SSSL Model, MCMM Model and Amateur Model (Andreff and Staudohar, 2000). 
(This graph uses the Manchester United data - a ‘typical’ MCMM model. Merchandising also includes commercial activities such as bar receipts) 
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Figure 3. Patterns of Financing in WRFU Clubs from 1950-1965 and 1988-2013 compared to the Andreff and Staudohar (2000) amateur model. 
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Figure 4. Patterns of Expenditure in WRFU Clubs from 1950-1965 and 1998-2013. 
 
 52 
 
Table 1: Number of clubs recording a surplus or deficit in 1950-1965 and 1998-2013  
Year # of Clubs 
making 
Surplus 
% of Clubs 
making 
Surplus 
# of Clubs 
making 
Deficit 
% of Clubs 
making 
Deficit 
Total 
Expenditure/ 
Total Income 
(Average - %) 
1950 2 50% 2 50% 87.0% 
1955 4 80% 1 20% 81.5% 
1960 5 100% 0 0% 44.6% 
1965 4 80% 1 20% 84.5% 
Average 15 79% 4 21% 74.4% 
1998 11 65% 6 35% 99.4% 
2003 12 70% 5 30% 92.8% 
2008 10 53% 9 47% 99.9% 
2013 11 65% 6 35% 101.1% 
Average 44 63% 26 37% 98.3% 
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i  The conceptualization of professionalization in sport differs markedly, as has been shown even in 
accounting by Birkett and Evans (2005) (who highlight the ‘varying degrees of precision’ in the use 
of the term professionalization).  It is necessary to distinguish between professionalization as it 
relates to ‘professions’ (such as accounting and law) and the use of the notions of 
professionalization and professionalism as they relate to forms of work.  Freidsen (1994: 109) 
highlighted the differences between being a “professional” and “amateur” on the exchange value, 
or payments for work undertaken, which is the simple definition used here.  This is because, even 
in the very top levels of sport, Seippel (2002) argued that payment alone is not enough and that 
professionalization of sport through payment of players has not yet reached Wilensky’s (1964) 
professionalization schema levels four (establishment of a jurisdiction through state-sanctioned 
licensing) and five (development of a formal code of ethics).   
ii  Malcolm et al. (2000) note that Rugby League, which professionalized earlier than Rugby Union, 
gained players from that code who sought to be paid for play at the elite level and were able to 
use their Union skills in League. Following the IRB’s decision to allow payment, a number of 
League players returned to Union.  Further, League clubs were a source of supply to the newly 
professionalized game (Malcolm et al., 2000). 
iii  Halabi et al. (2012) use of the term ‘professionalism’ in their case study of the Carlton Football 
Club in the 1910s to describe payment of otherwise amateur players. However, in this paper, we 
seek to distinguish payment (as an aspect of professionalization) from beliefs, values and actions 
(as dimensions of professionalism).   
iv  Andreff and Staudohar (2000) also describe the ‘American model’ from which the MCMM model is 
fashioned, although they recognise that specific North American aspects make it particular to that 
social-economic environment (including the mainly domestic and closed nature of its competition 
structures and its professional sports team franchises). 
v  In this respect, the requirements on these clubs is similar to those on incorporated Victorian AFL 
clubs as reported by Halabi (2007). 
vi  A club registered under the Incorporated Societies Act 1908 may be wound up voluntarily by its 
members (but not creditors), by application to the Supreme Court by a member, creditor or by the 
society itself, or by the Registrar – typically for non-filing of their annual accounts.  In the case of 
dissolution, the net assets they may be distributed to the members at the date of dissolution 
(Incorporated Societies Act 1908 s.5(b)) or as the Court suggests. 
vii  http://www.societies.govt.nz/cms 
viii  http://www.charities.govt.nz 
ix  Ethics approval was obtained from the relevant University committee.  
x  Comparative figures for “other” from the Andreff and Staudohar (2000) study include funds 
sourced from national and local government.  This does not occur in New Zealand.   
xi  NZRU submission to measures proposed by MP Te Ururoa Flavell, as reported by Deane (2013). 
xii  This included Premier team blazers and match-related expenses, travel related expenses 
(including buses for away games), weekly team meals and/or after-match catering for visitors, 
injured players’ insurance, team uniforms and playing equipment, laundry of same, medical tape, 
WRFU levies, ground rental, and sundry playing expenses. 
xiii  This included the Community Coaching Officer (or Regional Development Officer), Summer Rugby 
Academies, International Rugby Association of New Zealand courses, pre-season tournaments, 
and assistance to the Junior section. 
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xiv  Injury insurance was moderately common in the pre-professionalization accounts, but it appeared 
that players funded this through a special subscription. Further, following the Accident 
Compensation Act 1972, New Zealand now has a ‘no blame’ accident insurance scheme which 
would cover the major expenses incurred from rugby injuries and 80% of the players’ income 
foregone (after a short stand-down period).  
